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1 Introduction
Emissions trading, or cap and trade, is an increasingly popular environmental policy instrument used
to encourage firms to reduce pollution. A permit represents the right to emit an specific amount of a
pollutant; firms are required to hold a number of permits equivalent to their emissions, and are legally
forced to reduce them, from their business as usual level, i.e., their emissions in the absence of regulation,
to the number of permits they hold, and bear any associated abatement costs. The main objective of this
policy approach is to achieve the emission target reduction at the lowest economic cost, i.e., to achieve
an efficient allocation of permits among polluting firms.
Under an emission trading system, the environmental authority sets a binding emission target that is
allocated to firms in the form of emissions permits, and the permits can be traded in a secondary market.
In this secondary market, buyers pay for the right to increase their emissions, while sellers gain a reward
for decreasing them. To make the initial allocation among firms, until recently, the most widespread
method was grandfathering, i.e., the distribution of permits for free based on historical emissions, but
recently, auctions are increasingly being used. It is well established in the literature that if the secondary
market is perfectly competitive, those firms who can reduce emissions most cheaply will do so, which
ensures that the equilibrium allocation will be efficient.1 If this is the case, the initial allocation of per-
mits only matters for the distribution of the gains from trade but is irrelevant to achieve efficiency: both
grandfathering and auctions attain efficiency.
On the other hand, as first noted by Hahn (1984), if the secondary market for emission permits is not
perfectly competitive, the initial allocation of permits matters for efficiency. One of the main reasons for
using auctions as an allocation mechanism is the usual belief that auctions attain allocation efficiency.2
However, while efficiency is a classical result for single-unit auctions, the existing theory reveals that
efficiency does not hold for multi-unit auctions when bidders demand multiple units, as it is the case of
emission permit auctions.
We analyze the uniform auction format, the one used in some of the most important emission permit
markets worldwide, with the EU ETS being the leading example. In a uniform auction, bidders submit
bids for different quantities at different prices, and the auctioneer determines the market clearing or
stop-out price, and accepts all bids above it. Bidders pay the stop-out price for all units won. We ignore
the secondary market of emission permits in order to analyze the efficiency of the uniform auction format
within a fairly simple theoretical model.
Two elements regarding the auction’s efficiency need to be stressed. First, in single-unit auctions,
efficiency can be simply achieved by assigning the good to the bidder with the highest valuation. Then,
assuming ex-ante symmetric bidders, any single-unit auction is efficient whenever equilibrium bids are
increasing in valuations. Efficiency is more complex in multi-unit multi-bid auctions, even assuming ex-
ante symmetric bidders, since a bid is a demand schedule instead of an scalar. As Ausubel et al (2014)
1 See, for example, Montgomery (1972).
2 For example, the European Commission is strengthening the introduction of auctions in the European Emission Trading
System (EU ETS) based on the belief that this method ”best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the
system, creates the greatest incentives for investment in a low-carbon economy and eliminates windfall profits”. See
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/faq en.htm, Section ”Why are allowances being auctioned?”.
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point out, bidders have an incentive to shade bids differently across units, since a bid for one unit may
determine the payment for other units won, and therefore efficiency is not guaranteed. Second, within
multi-unit multi-bid auctions, theoretical results state that there are multiple equilibria under the uni-
form auction format.3 If there are multiple equilibria, conditions under which the efficient equilibrium is
reached should be analyzed.
In this paper we follow Wilson (1979) share auctions approach, in which the good auctioned is as-
sumed to be perfectly divisible, and bidders -polluting firms- bid a continuous demand schedule. Bidders’
valuations of the permits are determined by their marginal abatement cost, that we assume to be de-
creasing, a reasonable assumption if the cost of reducing emissions is increasing as more emissions are
reduced. We further assume that they decrease linearly. Different polluting firms might -and generally
will- have different abatement technologies. We assume that at the time of bidding, bidders have some
private information about their marginal abatement costs. Specifically, those marginal costs have a slope
common to all bidders and an intercept, the bidder’s type, that varies across bidders and that is private
information. Therefore, in our model the marginal abatement costs are heterogeneous not only across
bidders, but also for each bidder for different units.
We restrict the analysis to interior equilibria, in which all bidders buy permits at the auction and
have positive abatement cost. We prove that interior equilibria are reached when the differences in the
abatement cost functions across bidders are not too large. We think that this is an interesting scenario
to analyze the auction’s efficiency.4
At the auction, bidders’ strategies map the privately observed types into demand functions, the bids.
Accordingly to the assumption of linear marginal abatement costs, we consider equilibria conformed by
strategies that are additively separable and linear in price and bidder’s type, while we allow for non-
linear responses. We prove that, as marginal abatement costs are linear in types, to restrict to equilibria
conformed by linear strategies is not essential, since the efficient allocation rule is also linear in types.
Our model results in multiplicity of equilibria under the uniform format. While some functional and
distributional assumptions are made for the sake of tractability, we believe that our model does consider
some of the relevant characteristics of the emission permits auctions.
Our results can be summarized as follows. We first characterize equilibria, and show that the bidding
behavior under any equilibrium strategy can be interpreted in terms of marginal valuation and price.
As the number of bidders tends to infinity, the highest marginal abatement cost bidder i has to pay,
conditional on his type, under his expected allocation in the auction, i.e., his valuation for the last unit
that he wins at the auction, is equal to the expected auction price. As the number of bidders increases,
the strategic aspect of bidding disappears. In contrast, with only two bidders, a bidder’s valuation for the
last unit that he wins at the auction is larger than the expected auction price. Secondly, we show that
multiplicity of equilibria is, somehow, limited. A linear strategy is characterized by three parameters: a
3 See, for example, Wang and Zender (2002).
4 For example, participation in the EU ETS is mandatory for companies in some sectors, but ”only plants above a
certain size are included, certain small installations can be excluded if governments put in place fiscal or other measures
that will cut their emissions by an equivalent amount, and in the aviation sector, until 2016 the EU ETS applies only to
flights between airports located in the European Economic Area (EEA)”. See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index
en.htm
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constant, the type’s coefficient and the price’s coefficient. We prove that there exist two differentiable
functions that define two of the parameters in terms of the third one, so that any interior equilibrium
can be characterized in terms of the type’s coefficient. Moreover, the set of values of the type’s coefficient
defining equilibrium strategies is an open interval. This is important for two reasons. First, regarding
the positive properties of equilibria, existence and uniqueness can be easily analyzed within the real line.
Second, there is a normative side, since we next give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in
terms of that parameter: it has to be equal to the inverse of the coefficient of the bidder emission level
on the marginal abatement cost function.
Next, we analyze the efficiency of equilibria. We use a concept of ex-post efficiency, as Ausubel et al
(2014). We consider two cases. First, we analyze a pure private value case, in which the bidders’ types
are privately observed and are independent across bidders. Next, we consider a mineral right model, in
with bidders’ types are correlated. In both cases, we find that the unique efficient allocation of permits
can be attained as an interior equilibrium for any number of bidders equal or greater than two. In the
case of independent types, for a small number of bidders (we prove our result for two bidders), there
are other equilibria beside the efficient equilibrium. We also provide a categorization of the inefficiency
of equilibria. At the efficient allocation, marginal abatement cost are equalized across bidders. Then, a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for efficiency, is that a firm with larger marginal abatement cost for
all units (higher type), is awarded more permits at the auction than any other firm with lower marginal
abatement cost. This is always the case, given that the equilibrium strategies have the same slope and
different intercepts. However, some equilibrium are inefficient because firms with high types get too few
permits with respect to the efficient allocation, while some other equilibria are inefficient because firms
with high types get too many. We label those inefficiencies as under or over assignment, respectively,
of the environmentally inefficient firms. The main difference between independent and correlated types
is that when the number of bidders tends to infinity, while the number of permits per bidder remains
constant, when types are independent the only equilibrium is the efficient equilibrium, while when types
are correlated there are other equilibria besides the efficient equilibrium. This is one of the main results
of our analysis: in our model, the existence of many bidders is a sufficient condition to guarantee the
efficiency in the uniform auction if, additionally, the bidders’ types are independent. In contrast, for a
case of correlated types, we show that a large number of bidders is not sufficient for efficiency.
Our paper relates to Ausubel et al (2014), that using the share auction approach establish that every
equilibrium of the uniform-price auction is ex post inefficient when bidders have flat demands, i.e., when
they have constant marginal utility. The reason is differential bid shading. In their paper, when bidders
have linearly decreasing marginal utility, as in our paper, they consider, as we do, linear equilibrium, in
order to address the multiplicity of equilibria. The difference with our paper is that they assume that
bidders’ marginal utility functions are identical, and therefore efficiency is not an issue. In contrast, we
allow for bidders’ specific values. In their paper, supply is uncertain, while in our paper the number of
permits auctioned is known. Ausubel and Cramton (2002) analyze efficiency of a uniform price auction
in a pure private value where bidders’ marginal values are decreasing in quantity, as we do, and conclude
that there does not exist an ex post efficient equilibrium. The main difference with our model is that
they impose bidding strategies such that bidders bid their valuation for the first unit, which implies that
the bid curves lie strictly below the marginal-value curve at all positive quantities. We obtain such an
equilibria in our model, that, as in their case, is not efficient because there is differential bid shading.
However, allowing more general linear equilibria, we show that there are efficient equilibria in the uniform
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There is a branch of literature that analyze the efficiency of the cap-and-trade system when there is
market power in the permit market. Hahn (1984) stated that if a dominant firm exists, the efficiency loss
due to market power depends on the initial allocation of permits and the permit price is an increasing
function of the dominant firm’s allocation. Hagem and Westskog (1998) extended the Hahn setting in a
dynamic framework. An overview of this literature can be found in Montero (2009).
We aim at filling a gap in the theoretical literature regarding auctions of emission permits. Some au-
thors have addressed permit auctioning from a descriptive point of view (see. e.g., Hepburn et al (2006)
or Cramton and Kerr (2002)) or by means of experimental studies (see, e.g., Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore
(1994), Godby (1999), Godby (2000), Muller et al (2002) or Goeree et al (2010)). Also some theoretical
approximations have been made. Antelo and Bru (2009) compare auctioning and grandfathering in a
permit market with a dominant firm when the government is concerned both about cost-effectiveness
and public revenue. Alvarez and Andre´ (2015b) and Alvarez and Andre´ (2015a) also compare auctioning
and grandfathering when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private infor-
mation on their own abatement technologies. Kline and Menezes (1999) examine a stylized version of
EPA double auctions between buyers and sellers. Nevertheless, none of this study addresses multi-unit,
multi-bid auctions of permits as we do in a standard auction theory approach. Antelo and Bru (2009)
assume perfect information, and hence omit one of the main ingredients of auctions. Alvarez and Andre´
(2015b) consider that the bidders act non-strategically and in Alvarez and Andre´ (2015a) only one firm
(the dominant one) bids strategically. Kline and Menezes (1999) do not address the use of auctions to
make the initial allocation of permits by the environmental authority (as it is done in the UE ETS),
but only to exchange permits among firms. Moreover, they use a single-unit approach and restrict them-
selves to perfect information except for two specific examples under complete information. So, apart
from addressing the specific question on efficiency, our aim is to contribute to the theoretical literature
by providing a sound model for permit auctioning and bidding.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and in Section 3 we characterize
the equilibria in Proposition 1, show that the set of interior equilibria conformed by linear strategies can
be indexed by a parameter in Proposition 2, and establish the existence and multiplicity of equilibria in
Proposition 3. In Section 4 we analyze the efficiency of the equilibria, when bidders’ types are independent
in Proposition 5 and when types are correlated in Proposition 6. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Appendix contains all proofs.
2 The model
Assume that Q perfectly divisible permits are inelastically supplied in a uniform auction with I bidders,
the polluting firms, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, with I ≥ 2.
Bidder i’s marginal abatement cost is linear, defined by
φ (e; α˜i) := α˜i − βe (1)
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where α˜i is a bidder-specific random variable, his type, e is the bidder’s emission level, and β is some
positive constant.5 Types are drawn from a joint continuous distribution, which is common knowledge.
The realization of α˜i is privately observed by bidder i before the auction, i.e., each firms knows his
marginal abatement cost function before the auction, but not his rivals’. We assume that the marginal
probability distribution of types is identical across types, i.e., bidders are ex ante symmetric, and has
support Ω ≡ [α, α].
Note that equation (1) implies that bidders have marginal values for additional permits that are
decreasing in the quantity received. As Ausubel et al (2014) point out, this is an aspect of multi-unit
demands not present in auctions of unit demands.6
Let C(qi;αi) denote bidder i’s total cost of complying with the emission cap when his type is αi and
he wins qi permits at the auction. The qi permits won at the auction give the bidder the right to pollute
qi units, and he has to incur in the cost of reducing pollution from his business as usual emission level,
that is, bidder i’s emission level in the absence of environmental regulation, to qi. Let e
∗(αi) denote
bidder’s i business as usual emission level when his type is αi. Since φ is strictly decreasing in e, it is
defined as the value of e that solves φ(e;αi) = 0; from (1), it is e
∗(αi) = αi/β. Bidder i’s total cost is the
sum of the auction payment and his abatement cost. Under the uniform format bidders pay the same
price for all permits, the auction stop-out price, p, defined as the maximum price at which all permits
are sold, so that bidder i’s total cost is defined by
C(qi;αi) := pqi +
∫ e∗(αi)
qi
φ(e;αi)de (2)
The first term in (2) is bidder i’s auction payment under the uniform format given stop-out price p, and
the second term is his abatement cost.
We follow Wilson (1979) share auctions approach: we assume that the Q permits are perfectly
divisible, and bidders’ strategies are a continuous demand schedule, that we define next.
Definition 1 Strategy. Bidder i’s strategy at the auction is a demand function, γi(αi, p), that for each
realizations of his type, αi ∈ Ω, specifies the quantity demanded at different price levels, p:
γi : Ω ×R+ → R+
Denote by Γ the strategy space, which we restrict to the class of functions that are continuous and
non-increasing in p.
A profile of strategies is a vector γ := (γ1, . . . , γI), which specifies a strategy for each bidder. We
alternatively write γ = (γi,γ−i), where γ−i is the vector of strategies played by all bidders except i.
Bidder i’s best response to γ−i is the strategy γi that minimizes his expected cost:
E{C(qi;αi) | γi,γ−i}
5 A tilde denotes random variable. The same letter without tilde denotes an arbitrary realization.
6 They also consider diminishing marginal values that are linear, as we do, but they assume that αi = αj with probability
one for all i and j.
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where the expectation is taken with respect to α−i, his rivals’ types.
The game is a simultaneous game of incomplete information, for which the standard equilibrium
concept is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, that we define next.
Definition 2 Equilibrium. A profile of strategies (γ∗1 , . . . , γ
∗
I ) is an equilibrium if and only if, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, γi ∈ Γ and αi ∈ Ω, it is
E{C(qi;αi) | γ∗i ,γ∗−i} ≤ E{C(qi;αi) | γi,γ∗−i}
that is, γ∗i is a best response to γ
∗
−i: bidder i cannot lower his expected cost by deviating from γ
∗
i when
all other bidders are playing γ∗−i.
We focus on symmetric equilibria of the form (γ∗, . . . , γ∗); i.e., any two bidders with the same type
submit the same demand function. In the sequel, we refer to a Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibrium
simply as an equilibrium. When (γ∗, . . . , γ∗) is an equilibrium, we say that γ∗ is the equilibrium strategy.
Moreover, p∗ and q∗i refer hereafter to the auction’s stop-out price and to bidder i’s allocation under an
equilibrium strategy; these values depend on the vector of bidder’s types.
3 Characterization of equilibria
In this Section we characterize the auction equilibria. We consider demands that are additively separable
in bidder’s type and price, and that are linear in price.7 Specifically, we consider equilibria conformed
by strategies of the form
γ(αi, p) = τ(αi)− δp (3)
where τ is an arbitrary function of the bidder’s observed type and δ is some positive constant. Both τ (·)
and δ are to be determined at the equilibrium. We must remark that the strategy space is not restricted
to this class of strategies, i.e. arbitrary responses within Γ are allowed.
Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to interior equilibria. We say that an allocation of permits is
interior if each bidder receives a positive amount of permits and has strictly positive abatement cost.
An equilibrium is interior if the stop-out price is non-negative and generates an interior allocation with
probability one, that is, for any vector of types’ realizations.
Our approach to characterize equilibria rests on the fact that, under the uniform format, a bidder’s
auction payment depends only on the stop-out price and the quantity demanded at that price. We pro-
ceed as follows. Select an arbitrary bidder, i. First, we characterize the stop-out price that minimizes
bidder i’s expected total cost, given that all of his rivals are playing some (and the same) arbitrary
strategy as in (3). Then, we characterize the expected stop-out price if all bidders, including i, follow
7 Wang and Zender (2002) and Ausubel et al (2014) also consider separable strategies when analyzing equilibria with
asymmetric bidder information, as we do in this paper. As Ausubel et al (2014) mention, obtaining predictive results in
multi-unit auctions in settings with decreasing marginal utilities, as we have in our model, requires strong assumptions.
8 Francisco Alvarez et al.
that strategy. That strategy is the equilibrium strategy if and only if, for each αi ∈ Ω, the expected
stop-out price when all bidders play the strategy is equal to the stop-out price that minimizes bidder i’s
expected total cost, both expectations being conditional on αi. The next Proposition characterizes the
equilibrium strategy. All proofs are left to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Consider an strategy γ, as in (3). At any interior equilibrium, the following equality
holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , I} with probability 1
αi − β
(
I − 1
I
)(
τ(αi)− δE{p∗−i | γ, αi}
)
=
2
I
× τ(αi)
δ
+
(
I − 2
I
)
× E{p∗−i | γ, αi} (4)
where E{p∗−i | γ, αi} is the expected stop-out price if all bidders but i follow γ and bidder i bids zero.
To interpret (4), consider first the case in which there is a large number of bidders, I → ∞. With
many bidders, each bidder’s contribution to aggregate demand is small, and thus E{p∗−i | γ, αi} tends
to the expected auction price, E{p∗−i | γ, αi} → E{p∗ | γ, αi} as I →∞. Then equation (4) is
αi − β (τ(αi)− δE{p∗ | γ, αi}) = E{p∗ | γ, αi} (5)
The left hand side of (5) is the marginal abatement cost bidder i has to pay under his expected
allocation in the auction,8 τ(αi)− δE{p∗ | γ, αi}. At the equilibrium, that expected marginal cost, his
saving on abatement cost from the last unit, equals the expected auction price, the right hand size of
(5). The intuition behind this result is that the presence of many bidders eliminates strategical aspects
from the bidders’ strategies, and bidders bid to equalize their expected marginal abatement cost of the
last unit won at the auction to the expected price.
Next, consider a finite number of bidders, I ≥ 2, with bidders acting strategically. The left hand side
of (4) is still an estimation of the highest marginal abatement cost bidder i has to pay under his expected
equilibrium allocation. To see this, assume that all bidders but i follow some strategy γ as in (3). Let p∗−i
and p∗ denote the auction’s stop-out price considering the demand of all bidders but the i and all bidders,
respectively. Thus, p∗−i satisfies
∑
j 6=i τ(αj)− (I− 1)δp∗−i = Q whereas p∗ satisfies
∑
j τ(αj)− Iδp∗ = Q.
From the linearity in price of the previous equations, it follows I−1I
(
τ(αi)− δp∗−i
)
= τ(αi) − δp∗. The
term multiplying β on the left hand side of (4) is therefore bidder i’s expected allocation, so that the
left hand side is bidder i’s highest expected marginal abatement cost.
To interpret the right hand side of (4), assume that bidder i expects to win some permits in the
auction by following γ when all other bidders follow γ as well. In that case, he expects the auction price
to be strictly above E{p∗−i | γ, αi} and strictly below τ(αi)/δ, this latter being the highest price -under
γ- at which he demands a positive quantity. The right hand side of (4) is a convex combination of those
lower and upper bounds, with the upper bound having less weight as I increases. This is illustrated in
Figure 1. In the Figure, D−i(p) is the demand of all bidders but the i, and p∗−i the corresponding stop-out
price, determined by the intersection of D−i(p) and the vertical line representing the inelastic supply of
Q permits. Bidder i’s demand is τ(αi)− δp. The aggregate demand is D(p), and the corresponding stop
out price is p∗. The Figure shows that bidder i wins permits at the auction if and only if p∗ satisfies
8 More precisely, we refer to the marginal abatement cost of the last unit.
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p∗−i < p
∗ < τ(αi)δ . The quantity of permits awarded to bidder i at the equilibrium is q
∗
i , which satisfies
τ(αi)− δp∗ = q∗i = I−1I
(
τ(αi)− δp∗−i
)
.9 Therefore,the right hand side of (4) is bidder i’s estimate of the
stop-out price at an interior equilibrium.
Note that with two bidders, I = 2, the right hand side of (4) is τ(αi)/δ, which is the upper bound
for the expected auction price whenever bidder i wins permits at the auction. In contrast with the many
bidders case, when there are only two bidders, the expected abatement cost of the last unit the bidder
wins at the auction (left side of (4)) is larger than the expected auction’s price. Therefore, with I finite
there is an strategic component in bidding, that disappears when I →∞.
p
0 q
Q
D−i(p)
p∗−i
τ(αi)
δ
τ(αi)− δp
D(p) := D−i(p) + τ(αi)− δp
p∗
q∗i
Fig. 1: The supply of permits is the vertical line at Q, and D−i(p) is the demand of all bidders but the
i; the intersection determines the corresponding stop-out price, i p∗−i. Bidder i’s demand is τ(αi) − δp.
The aggregated demand is D(p), and p∗ the corresponding stop out price. Bidder i wins permits at the
auction if and only if p∗ satisfies p∗−i < p
∗ < τ(αi)δ . The quantity awarded to bidder i at the equilibrium
is q∗i .
Next, we focus on equilibria that are linear both in bidder’s type and price, that is, such that the
strategy conforming an equilibrium is linear in both arguments, αi and p. Apart from its simplicity, lin-
ear strategies are natural candidates to conform an equilibrium as the marginal abatement cost function
-which defines the valuation of the permits auctioned- is assumed to be linear. Moreover, our analysis will
illustrate that if the marginal abatement cost and the strategies conforming the equilibria have similar
shapes, there is a straightforward way to analyze efficiency.
The next Lemma characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear strategy (not neces-
sarily conforming an equilibrium) to generate an interior allocation.
9 Without loss of generality, in the Figure we have represented a case for which αi < maxj 6=i(αj), but the graph is valid
for all cases around p∗.
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Lemma 1 Consider an arbitrary linear strategy
γ(αi, p) = κ0 + κ1αi − δp
where κ0, κ1 and δ are constants. Assume that all bidders play γ. Under γ, each bidder demands a
positive quantity at the stop-out price and the stop-out price is positive (with probability one) if and only
if
I(κ0 + κ1α) > Q > (I − 1)κ1 (α− α) (6)
Furthermore, under the auction allocation, each bidder’s marginal abatement cost is non-negative (with
probability one) if and only if
βQ
I
≤
{
α if βκ1 ≤ II−1
α− βκ1 I−1I (α− α) otherwise
(7)
The first inequality in (6) gives the condition under which the stop-out price is strictly positive with
probability one: if all bidders get the lowest possible signal, α, the aggregate quantity demanded at price
0, I(κ0 + κ1α), has to be greater than Q. The second inequality gives the condition under which each
bidder demands a positive quantity of permits at the stop-out price with probability one: the worst sce-
nario is that all bidders but one get the highest signal, α, and one of them gets the lowest one, α; in that
case, the last kink in the aggregate demand is at a price equal to the vertical intercept of the demand of
the bidder with the lowest signal,
κ0
δ
+
κ1
δ
α, with a quantity demanded equal to (I − 1)κ1 (α− α). The
second inequality in (6) states that Q has to be greater than that quantity. Note that it imposes that
the dispersion of types, α− α has to be low enough. Finally, condition (7) states that each bidder has a
positive abatement cost if the number of permits auctioned is low enough.
Next, we characterize the set of linear and interior equilibria. We assume hereafter that the expected
value of rivals’ types conditional on the own observed type is linear. Therefore, for any two bidders, i
and j, it is
E{α˜j | αi} = (1− λ)E{α˜i}+ λαi (8)
where λ denotes the linear correlation between α˜i and α˜j , which we assume to be common for any
pair of types. In the sequel we assume λ ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that, additionally, we assume equal marginal
distribution of types.
The next Proposition shows that the set of interior equilibria conformed by linear strategies can be
indexed by κ1, the type’s coefficient on the strategy’s horizontal intercept: there is a one-to-one mapping
from the values of κ1 to the set of interior equilibria conformed by linear strategies. This is important
for two reasons. First, regarding the positive properties of the equilibrium, its existence and uniqueness
can be easily studied within the real line (as κ1 is real-valued) instead of the more complex space of
linear strategies. Second, there is a normative side: we will show that the efficiency of any equilibrium
strategy depends only on κ1.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique pair of two real valued differentiable functions, (g0, gδ), such that
a linear strategy with coefficients (κ0, κ1, δ), conforms an interior equilibrium if and only if κ0 = g0(κ1)
and δ = gδ(κ1). Moreover, gδ is strictly increasing, with gδ(0) = 0.
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From Proposition 2, it is easy to prove that δ > 0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the equilibrium strategy is
downward sloping. Given the properties of gδ, this implies that κ1 > 0, i.e., the equilibrium strategy’s
horizontal intercept is increasing in αi. Therefore, for any two firms i and j such that αi > αj , the
demand of the less efficient firm, i, lies to the right of the demand of the more efficient firm, i.e., the
former bids a higher price for each given amount of permits than his rival.
Note that the equilibrium strategies considered by Ausubel and Cramton (2002) and Ausubel et al
(2014) correspond to κ1 = δ and κ0 = 0. Imposing κ1 = δ, g0(κ1) from Proposition 2 implies κ0 = 0,
i.e., our equilibria includes theirs.10
The next Proposition analyzes the existence of equilibria conformed by linear strategies.
Proposition 3 Assume that
α− α < βQ
I
< α. (9)
Then there exists a non-empty interval, say (κl1, κ
u
1 ), with (κ
l
1, κ
u
1 ) ⊂ (0,∞) and a subinterval [0, λu) ⊂
[0, 1), such that, if λ ∈ [0, λu), for any κ′1 ∈ (κl1, κu1 ) the linear strategy with coefficients (κ0, κ1, δ) =
(g0(κ
′
1), κ
′
1, gδ(κ
′
1)) constitutes an interior equilibrium, where g0 and gδ are defined in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 states a condition for the existence of interior equilibria: the range of types, α − α,
has to be low in comparison with the infimum of Ω, α. Intuitively, if we allow for too different types
across bidders, under a symmetric equilibrium it might occur that the bidder with the lowest type gets
no permits. There is a simple conceptual reason to focus on interior equilibria, which is to limit the
ex-ante heterogeneity across bidders. Equivalently, any such mechanism would (or at least should) pro-
duce rather obvious assignments. In the analysis that follows we will make use of (9) or stronger though
qualitatively similar conditions.
Additionally, Proposition 3 states that even with linear strategies there is a continuum of equilibria,
that is, there are multiple equilibria for the uniform auction. The values of κ1 defining an equilibrium
belong to an open interval in the real line, while the functions that map each value of κ1 into the associ-
ated values of (κ0, δ) are continuous, as stated in Proposition 2. It is important to notice that, in some
sense, the equilibria are close to one another, since we are considering interior equilibria.
4 Efficiency
We use an ex-post efficiency concept, as in Ausubel et al (2014). Given a vector of types’ realizations
and a total amount of permits, Q, the efficient allocation of permits minimizes the total abatement cost
among the I firms. The formal definition is presented next.
10 In fact, imposing κ1 = δ we obtain the unique equilibrium strategy in equation (9) of Ausubel et al (2014), allowing
for different types.
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Definition 3 Efficient allocation. Given a total amount of permits, Q, and a vector of types real-
izations, α = (α1, . . . , αI), an assignment of the Q permits among bidders, q
o = (qo1, . . . , q
o
I ), is ex post
efficient if it minimizes the total abatement cost:11
qo ≡ argmin{q1,...,qI}
{
I∑
i=1
∫ e∗i (αi)
qi
φi(e;αi)de |
I∑
i=1
qi ≤ Q
}
The definition of efficiency is contingent on Q, the quantity of permits auctioned: we do not define
the efficient quantity of permits to be auctioned but take that quantity as exogenous and focus on its
efficient distribution. This concept of efficiency is usually termed as cost-effective in environmental eco-
nomics. Since in our model the marginal abatement cost for each firm and each type realization is strictly
decreasing, that cost-minimizing or efficient allocation is unique.
We restrict the analysis to parameter values for which the cost-minimizing allocation is interior with
probability one. Under an interior allocation, each firm buys permits at the auction and has positive
abatement costs. If the efficient allocation is interior, marginal abatement costs are equalized across
bidders, that is, φ(qoi ;αi) = φ(q
o
j ;αj) for any i and j in {1, . . . , I}. The next Lemma characterizes the
subspace of parameter values for which the efficient allocation is interior with probability one. We use
the following terminology. An strategy is efficient if the permits allocation when all bidders play it is the
efficient allocation with probability one. The Lemma also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a
strategy as in (3) to be efficient.
Lemma 2
1. The efficient allocation is interior with probability one iff
(I − 1)(α− α) ≤ βQ ≤ Iα
2. Assume that the efficient allocation is interior and consider an strategy γ as in (3). Then γ is efficient
if and only if τ is linear, τ(α) = κ0 + κ1α, with βκ1 = 1.
Figure 2 shows the geometry of part 1 of Lemma 2 when there are two bidders, in the q1q2 plane.
The feasible allocations of permits are delimited by the triangle {(0, 0), (0, Q), (Q, 0)}. The red lines are
type-dependent. The dashed line α1 − βq1 = α2 − βq2, which represents allocations for which marginal
abatement cost are equal across bidders, changes its intercept as the difference between types, α2 − α1,
changes. If the types are too different, i.e., if |α2−α1| is too big, that line shifts too much either upwards
or downwards so that the optimal allocation is to assign all permits to the highest type firm. Further-
more, if too many permits are available, that is, if Q is too large, the point A, which represents the
business as usual emission level, lies inside the feasible triangle, so that the efficient allocation is A, and
abatement cost are zero. Finally, if |α2−α1| and Q are both small enough, the efficient allocation, E, is
an interior allocation: both bidders buy permits at the auction and have positive abatement costs. We
arbitrarily have selected a realization of types such that α2 − α1 < 0, so that at the efficient allocation
bidder 2 buys less permits than bidder 1.
11 Since ex-post efficient is type-dependent, we should write qo(α) instead of qo, but we drop the argument for ease of
exposition. For the same reason, we omit a non-negativity constraint which applies component-wise in qo.
Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient? 13
q2
0 q1
Q
Q
α2
β
A
α1
β1
β
(α2 − α1)
α1 − βq1 = α2 − βq2
qo2
E
qo1
Fig. 2: Geometry of the efficient allocation for I = 2 in the q1q2 plane. The feasible allocations of permits are delimited
by the triangle {(0, 0), (0, Q), (Q, 0)}. The red lines are type-dependent. The dashed line α1 − βq1 = α2 − βq2 changes its
intercept as the difference α2 − α1 changes. If |α2 − α1| is big, that line shifts too much either upwards or downwards so
that the optimal allocation is to assign all permits to the highest type firm. Furthermore, if too many permits are available,
that is, Q is too large, the point A, which corresponds to the business as usual emission level, lies inside the feasible
triangle, so that the efficient allocation is A, under which the marginal abatement costs are zero. Finally, if |α2 − α1| and
Q are both small enough, the efficient allocation, E, is interior. We arbitrarily have selected a realization of types such
that α2 − α1 < 0.
Part 2 of Lemma 2 states that ex-post efficient strategies are easily characterized in our model: κ1,
the type’s coefficient in the strategy played by all bidders, has to be equal to 1β , the inverse of the slope
of the marginal abatement cost function. To understand this condition, assume that all firms play an
strategy γ as in Lemma 1, and that the corresponding equilibrium allocation is (q∗1 , ..., q
∗
I ). Consider any
two firms, i and j, such that αi > αj , i.e., such that firm i has higher marginal abatement cost for any
emission level than his rival. If κ1 > 0, the less efficient firm, firm i, bids more aggressively and thus
gets more permits at the auction than his rival. Still, the less efficient firm might not obtain the efficient
amount of permits. Given γ, the difference in marginal abatement costs among firms is
φ(q∗i ;αi)− φ(q∗j ;αj) = (1− βκ1)(αi − αj)
Clearly, equality of the marginal abatement costs is ex-post guaranteed only if κ1 satisfies 1− βκ1 = 0.
Contrarily, if κ1 > 0 and 1 − βκ1 > 0, the highest type firm has higher marginal abatement cost than
his rival at the equilibrium. In other words, the highest type firm gets more permits that his rival, but
fails to get enough permits as to equalize marginal abatement costs. We say that the less efficient firm is
under-assigned in the auction with respect to the efficient allocation. Analogously, the case κ1 > 0 and
1 − βκ1 < 0 leads to an over-assignment of the less efficient firm. These departures from the efficient
strategy are depicted in Figure 3, for the case of two bidders. In the Figure, we represent in both panels
the marginal abatement cost function, φ, for two bidders, 1 and 2, such that α1 > α2 and q
∗
1 > q
∗
2 , which
necessarily rests on strategies (which are not plotted) with κ1 > 0. However, the marginal abatement
cost at the equilibrium are not equal across firms, as efficiency requires. Panel (a) represents a permit
allocation and the corresponding marginal abatement costs when 1−βκ1 > 0, and thus the less efficient
firm (firm with type α1) is under-assigned, so that φ(q
∗
1 ;α1) > φ(q
∗
2 ;α2). Panel (b) represents a case in
which the less efficient firm is over-assigned.
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φ
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φ
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φ
q∗2
φ(q∗2 ;α2)
q∗1
φ(q∗1 ;α1)
(a) 1− βκ1 > 0.
φ
e
α1
φ
α2
φ
q∗2
φ(q∗2 ;α2)
q∗1
φ(q∗1 ;α1)
(b) 1− βκ1 < 0.
Fig. 3: For I = 2, efficiency requires φ
(
q∗1 ;α1
)
= φ
(
q∗2 ;α2
)
. If both bidders play a strategy as in Lemma 1 (not plotted),
efficiency requires 1−βκ1 = 0. Panel (a) represents a permit allocation
(
q∗1 , q
∗
2
)
and the corresponding marginal abatement
costs when 1−βκ1 > 0, and thus the less efficient firm (firm with type α1) is under-assigned, so that φ(q∗1 ;α1) > φ(q∗2 ; , α2).
Panel (b) represents a case in which the less efficient firm is over-assigned.
Next, we analyze equilibrium strategies. The two essential questions analyzed in this section are as
follows. First, does the efficient strategy belong to the set of equilibria?12 And second, if there other
equilibria besides the efficient equilibrium, what sort of inefficiency characterize those equilibria?
As we use an ex-post concept of efficiency, the distribution of types is irrelevant for the efficient
allocation. However, the distributional assumptions matter for the equilibria. If all bidders have the
same type with probability one, with corresponds to λ = 1 in (8), under any symmetric equilibrium, all
bidders submit the same demand function, permits are equally shared among bidders and, since types
are identical, the allocation is efficient. In short, with λ = 1 any symmetric equilibrium is efficient. This
is the case analyzed by (Ausubel et al, 2014). But things are not that simple if types vary across bidders.
Subsection 4.1 analyzes the case of independent types, that is, λ = 0, and Subsection 4.2 considers an
special case of positively correlated types, λ = 1/2.
4.1 Independent types
In this Subsection we consider the case of independent types, i.e, λ = 0 in (8). Using the standard
terminology in auction theory, this is a pure private value case, as the valuations (marginal abatement
costs in our model) are privately observed and independent across bidders. The basic idea to analyze
efficiency follows from the previous Section. From Proposition 2, we know that the set of interior equilib-
ria is indexed by κ1, while from Lemma 2 we know that any linear strategy is characterized by βκ1 = 1.
Both results combined make the analysis of efficiency tractable, as it simply requires to find out the
equilibrium values of a real valued parameter, κ1. The next Proposition characterized interior equilibria.
Proposition 4 Assume (9) and λ = 0. Then, there exists some κ∗1 satisfying κ
∗
1 <
1
β
I
I−1 , such that a
linear strategy constitutes an interior equilibrium if and only if κ1 ∈
(
κ∗1,
1
β
I
I−1
)
. Furthermore, there
12 As mentioned above, we consider ex-post efficiency, that is, the efficient allocation depends on the realization of types.
The analogous ex-ante concept leads to a trivial conclusion as any symmetric equilibrium is ex-ante efficient.
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exists some finite value of I, say I0, such that for any I > I0: (i) κ∗1 increases as E{α˜i}, E{α˜i}−α or Q
increase (considering each of those variations separately), and (ii) the efficient equilibrium, characterized
by βκ1 = 1, is an interior equilibrium.
The basic message from Proposition 4 is that the set of (interior) equilibria is convex in the dimension
of κ1. In other words, the set of values of κ1 defining an equilibrium is an open interval, which depends
on parameters related to the types’ distribution and the number of bidders, I. The next Proposition
analyzes this latter dependence and defines efficient equilibria.
Proposition 5 Assume λ = 0 and
I
I − 1 (α− α) ≤
βQ
I − 1 ≤ α (10)
Then:
1. For all I ≥ 2 the efficient strategy is an interior equilibrium strategy, given by
γ∗0(αi, p) =
1
β
(
E{α˜i} − 1
I − 1βQ+ αi − 2p
)
For any bidder i and any αi ∈ Ω, it satisfies
E{p∗ | αi} ≤ E{φ(q∗i , αi) | αi} (11)
where p∗ is the auction’s stop-out price and q∗i is bidder i’s allocation of permits.
2. Consider I →∞ and Q→∞ while QI remains constant. Then the unique interior equilibrium is the
efficient strategy.
3. For the case I = 2, there exists some b0 ∈ (0, 1) such that any κ1 with βκ1 ∈ (b0, 2) defines an
equilibrium strategy. Additionally, in all equilibria, for any bidder i and any αi ∈ Ω, (11) is satisfied.
Part 1 of Proposition 5 presents the efficient strategy, that is an equilibrium strategy for all I ≥ 2.
From Proposition 2, given the value for κ1 that characterizes the efficient strategy, βκ1 = 1, there exists
unique values for (κ0, δ) that define the corresponding equilibrium strategy. The comparative statics
properties of the efficient equilibrium strategy are straightforward. Under (10), for each possible type’s
realization, the relative position of the efficient equilibrium strategy, γ, and the marginal abatement
cost function, φ, in the usual price-quantity axis, is as depicted in Figure 4: the efficient strategy has
a lower vertical intercept and a higher horizontal intercept than the marginal abatement cost function.
I.e., given that bidders are restricted to bid a linear strategy, the efficient equilibrium strategy is such
that bid shading is decreasing as q increases, and is negative (bidders bid more that their valuation for
those units) for q large enough.
Even if bidders bid higher than their valuation for some units, for all I ≥ 2, at the efficient equilib-
rium, bidders expect to have a positive surplus: the expected auction’s stop-out price is not greater than
the marginal abatement cost of the last permit bought at the auction, as stated on condition (11). This
is illustrated on Figure 4, for the realized stop-out price, p∗, and marginal abatement cost of the last
unit won, φ(q∗i ;αi). In the Figure, given p
∗, γ determines the assignment at the auction, q∗i , which in
turn determines the marginal saving in the abatement cost of the last unit won at the auction, φ(q∗i ;αi).
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According to (2), the bidder’s total cost is the payment in the auction (blue area) plus the abatement
cost, the area below φ from his assignment of permits, q∗i , up to e
∗(αi) (orange). If the firm had no
permits, his total cost would be the whole area below φ from zero to e∗(αi). Thus, his realized surplus
from participating in the auction is the green area. Notice that p∗ ≤ φ(q∗i , αi) implies a positive surplus:
under the uniform auction format, a sufficient condition to have a positive surplus is that the auction’s
stop-out price, p∗, is not larger than the marginal saving in the abatement cost of the last unit won at
the auction, φ(q∗i , αi).
p
0 q
αi
φ
e∗(αi)
γ
p∗
q∗i
φ(q∗i ;αi)
Fig. 4: An arbitrary linear strategy, γ, and the marginal abatement cost function, φ, are represented given the firm’s type,
αi. The auction’s stop-out price, p
∗, and γ determine the assignment in the auction, q∗i , which in turn determines the
marginal saving in the abatement cost of the last unit won at the auction, φ(q∗i ;αi). The bidder total cost is the payment
in the auction (blue area) plus the abatement cost, the area below φ from his assignment of permits up to e∗(αi) (orange).
If the firm had no permits, his total cost would be the whole area below φ from zero to e∗(αi). Thus, his realized surplus
from the auction is the green area. Notice that p∗ ≤ φ(q∗i , αi) implies a positive surplus.
Part 2 of Proposition 5 states an interesting property of the set of interior equilibria. As I → ∞
keeping the ratio Q/I constant, the only interior equilibrium is the efficient equilibrium: in a private
value model, an increase in the number of bidders drives the auction toward the efficient equilibrium.
This is not the case for I finite, as we illustrate on part 3 of Proposition 5, considering the case I = 2.
With only two bidders, there are inefficient equilibria. In terms of the notation previously introduced,
under some of those inefficient equilibria the firm with highest type is under-assigned while under some
other equilibria it is over-assigned. In all of those equilibria condition (11) holds, i.e., bidders expect to
have a positive surplus when participating in the auction.
4.2 Correlated types: mineral right model
In this Subsection we consider a specific probabilistic structure that implies private values with positively
correlated types. The basic idea is to split the bidders’ type into a common term plus a bidder specific
term, so that the correlation among different types arises from the common term. This corresponds
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to the mineral rights model, using auction theory terminology.13 In addition, we specify a probability
distributions for both terms so that the marginal distribution is identical across types, has finite support
and the conditional expectation of types is linear, as in (8).
Specifically, we assume that for all i
α˜i = θ + a˜+ u˜i (12)
where θ is a parameter, and {a˜, u˜1, . . . , u˜I} is a set of globally independent and identically distributed
zero-mean random variables. With this specification, a˜ is the common term for all types while the u’s
are bidder specific. Moreover, we assume that all the random variables are uniformly distributed in some
finite interval [−σ, σ], with σ fixed, which implies that the marginal distribution is identical across types,
with the support of α˜i being [θ − 2σ, θ + 2σ]. Straightforward calculation shows that the unconditional
expectation is given by E{α˜i} = θ, and, additionally,
E{α˜j | αi} = 1
2
(θ + αi) (13)
i.e, the expectation of the rivals’ type conditional on the own type is linear, as required in our model.
A direct comparison between (8) and (13) shows that the latter conveys λ = 12 . For our purposes, any
probabilistic structure leading to the same correlation value among types is essentially equivalent to the
one presented here.
Next, we analyze efficiency and equilibria when λ = 1/2. We focus in the comparison to the indepen-
dent case presented on the previous Subsection. The next Proposition summarizes our main results.
Proposition 6 Assume (10), λ = 1/2 and
2
I − 1βQ ≤ E{α˜i} 2(α− α) ≤
βQ
I
≤ 2α− α (14)
Then:
1. For all I ≥ 2 the efficient strategy is an interior equilibrium strategy, given by
γ∗1/2(αi, p) =
1
β
(
1
I + 1
E{α˜i} − 2
(I + 1)(I − 1)βQ+ αi −
I + 2
I + 1
p
)
For any bidder i and any αi ∈ Ω, it satisfies (11).
2. Consider I →∞ and Q→∞ while QI remains constant. Then there exists some b1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
κ1 defines an equilibrium strategy if and only if βκ1 ∈ (b1, 2). Additionally, in all equilibria, for any
i and αi ∈ Ω, (11) is satisfied.
Similar to part 1 of Proposition 5, part 1 of Proposition 6 presents the efficient strategy, that is an
equilibrium strategy for all I ≥ 2. As it is the case for λ = 0, in the efficient equilibria condition (11)
holds, and bidders expect to have a positive surplus from participating in the auction.
13 Usually, a mineral right model structure is used to correlate signals among bidders in a common value model, see
Krishna (2009). While our model is not a common value model, an analogous structure is used to correlate types.
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Part 2 of Proposition 6 states that, in contrast to the case of private values, there are many equilibria
besides the efficient equilibrium when types are correlated and I and Q → ∞, so that the ratio Q/I
stays constant. In all of them condition (11) holds, and bidders expect to have a positive surplus from
participating in the auction. This is one of the main results of our analysis: the existence of many bidders
is not a sufficient condition to guarantee an efficient equilibrium in the uniform auction. Additionally,
bidders’ types have to be uncorrelated. The next Corollary presents an example of an equilibrium that
is not efficient when I →∞ and λ = 12 .
Corollary 1 Assume I →∞ and Q→∞ while QI remains constant, and λ = 12 . An interior equilibrium
is characterized by βκ1 =
3
2 . The equilibrium strategy is
γ1/2(αi, p) =
3
β
(
E{αi}+ αi
2
− p
)
(15)
The stop-out price and the equilibrium allocation for bidder i are, respectively, p∗ = E{α˜i} − βQ3I and
q∗ = 32β (αi − E{α˜i}) + QI .
In the equilibrium presented in Corollary 1, all bidders with types αi such that αi < E{α˜i} bid more
than their valuations for all units, and even if they expect to have a positive surplus participating in
the auction, their realized surplus is negative. Only bidders with high types end up having a positive
surplus, even if they are over-assigned, given that 1− βκ1 < 0.
Finally, to conclude the analysis, the next Corollary compares efficient equilibrium strategies as I
and Q→∞ so that the ratio Q/I stays constant for λ = 0 and λ = 1/2.
Corollary 2 Assume I → ∞ and Q → ∞ while QI remains constant. Denote by γ∗λ for λ ∈ {0, 12} the
efficient equilibrium strategy at the limiting value of I when the correlation between types is λ. It is
γ∗0(αi, p) =
1
β
(
E{αi} − βQ
I
+ αi − 2p
)
γ∗1/2(αi, p) =
1
β
(αi − p) (16)
For λ ∈ {0, 12} the stop-out price and the equilibrium allocation for bidder i are, respectively, p∗ =
E{α˜i} − βQI and q∗ = 1β (αi − E{α˜i}) + QI .
Figure 5 shows the relative position of the efficient equilibrium strategy, γλ, for λ = 0 on panel (a),
and for λ = 12 on panel (b), and the marginal abatement cost function, φ(q;αi), common to both panels,
as I → ∞. Also common to both panels are the stop-out price, p∗ and the equilibrium allocation for
bidder i, q∗i . When types are uncorrelated, λ = 0, the unique interior equilibrium is such that bidders
bid lower than their marginal abatement cost for that particular unit for all quantities lower than q∗i ,
and bid higher than their marginal abatement cost for that particular unit for all quantities greater than
q∗i . In contrast, when types are correlated, λ =
1
2 , in the efficient equilibrium bidders bid their marginal
abatement cost for all units, and the equilibrium strategy is the inverse of the marginal abatement cost
function. For both cases, uncorrelated and correlated types, bidder i’s total cost is the same, the green
area in the Figure, equal to the auction’s payment, p∗q∗i , plus the abatement cost.
From the expression for the efficient allocation in Corollary 2, note that bidders whose type, αi, is
greater than the a priori expected value of types, E{α˜i}, get more permits at the auction than they
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would get if permits were equally shared among bidders, QI , while bidder whose type is lower than the
a priori expected value of types, get less.
p
0 q
αi
φ γ∗0
p∗
q∗i
(a) Uncorrelated types, λ = 0
p
0 q
αi
φ = γ∗
1/2
p∗
q∗i
(b) Correlated types, λ = 1/2
Fig. 5: The Figure shows the relative position of the efficient equilibrium strategy, γ∗λ, for λ = 0 on panel (a), and for
λ = 1
2
on panel (b), and the marginal abatement cost function, φ(q;αi), common to both panels, as I →∞. The auction
stop-out price is p∗ and the equilibrium allocation for bidder i is q∗i . The bidder’s total cost is the green area, equal to the
auction’s payment, p∗q∗i , plus the abatement cost.
5 Concluding remarks
Two final comments are in order. First, the concept of efficiency that we have used is taken from Ausubel
et al (2014), and it is standard in the environmental economics literature: it follows from minimizing
the sum of firms’ abatement costs. However, we might have been more general by considering Pareto
efficiency. An allocation of permits is Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto dominated, in the sense that
it is impossible to reduce one firm’s abatement cost without increasing at least other firm’s. A Pareto
efficient allocation minimizes the weighted sum of abatement costs for some given vector of weights. In
our model, it is straightforward to show that an allocation is not Pareto dominated if, under it, the
marginal abatement cost for each firm is strictly positive. Thus, any equilibrium strategy that satisfies
condition (7) in Lemma 1, that guarantees that each bidder’s marginal abatement cost is non-negative,
leads to an allocation of permits that is Pareto efficient, although, of course, it is not necessarily the
efficient allocation that we have considered in our analysis.
Second, once that we accept the concept of efficiency used in this paper, our analysis points to an
ideal situation for the uniform auction to be efficient: many bidders with independent types. However,
this is not necessarily a positive assessment for the uniform auction. Perhaps, the question is not whether
(or when) the uniform auction does good but whether it does better. For instance, it remains to analyze
how other auction-based mechanisms are expected to perform in a market fundamentally characterized
by a large number of relatively similar participants with independent types and a rigid initial supply of
permits. We claim that further research in this area would help to isolate the differential contribution of
the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism of emission permits.
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6 Proofs
The following notation is convenient for several of the proofs, while it is omitted from the main text to
ease the overall exposition.
µ := (1− λ)E{α˜i} (17)
And (8) can be rewritten as
E{α˜j | αi} = µ+ λαi
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that all bidders but i follow some -and the same- linear strategy, as
in (3). The residual supply for bidder i at price p is
S−i(p) = Q−
∑
j 6=i
τ(αj) + (I − 1)δp (18)
where
∑
j 6=i τ(αj), depends on the types of all bidders but the i. For an arbitrary stop-out price p, bidder
i’s realized cost is C(S−i(p), αi). After some algebra from (1), (2) and (18), we have
E{C(S−i(p), αi) | γ−i} = (−αi(I − 1)δ + (Q− ρˆ(αi))(1 + β(I − 1)δ)) p
+
(
1
2
β(I − 1)δ + 1
)
(I − 1)δp2 + θ (19)
where θ contains terms that do not depend on p and ρˆ(αi) := E{
∑
j 6=i τ(αj) | αi}. It is
θ = αi + (Q− ρˆ(αi))− β
2
(
e∗ + (Q− ρˆ(αi))2
)
(20)
Under the uniform format, bidder i’s cost depends only on the stop-out price and on the quantity
demanded at that price and, given a residual supply, there is a one-to-one mapping between that price
and that quantity. Thus, given a residual supply and αi, choosing the stop-out price is equivalent to
choosing the quantity demanded at that price. Given αi and the rivals’ strategy, the stop-out price that
minimizes bidder i’s expected cost is
min
p
E{C(S−i(p), αi) | γ−i}
Denote by p∗(αi,γ−i) the solution to that problem. From (19), first order conditions of bidder’s i
minimization problem imply that
p∗(αi,γ−i) =
αi(I − 1)δ − (Q− ρˆ(αi))(1 + β(I − 1)δ)
(2 + β(I − 1)δ)(I − 1)δ (21)
Assuming that all bidders (including i) play γ defined in (3), bidder i has no incentives to deviate if and
only if, for each αi ∈ Ω, the expected stop out price when all bidders are playing γ, conditional on αi,
is precisely p∗(αi,γ−i).
On the other hand, if all bidders follow γ defined in (3), the stop-out price can be characterized as
the solution in p to
S−i(p) = τ(αi)− δp
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Solving this latter equation in p, denoting the solution by po, and taking expectations conditional on αi,
we get
E{po | αi, γ} = 1
δI
(ρˆ(αi) + τ(αi)−Q) (22)
Thus, γ is an equilibrium if and only if (τ, δ) satisfy
p∗(αi,γ−i) = E{po | αi, γ} ∀αi ∈ Ω (23)
Using (21) and (22), we can re-write (23) as
αi =
ξ
I
× τ(αi)
δ
+
(
1− ξ
I
)
× 1
I − 1
1
δ
((ρˆ(αi)−Q) (24)
where ξ := 2 + β(I − 1)δ. Consider the equation S−i(p) = 0, where S−i(p) is given by (18), and denote
its solution by p−i. It is
E{p−i | γ, αi} = 1
I − 1
1
δ
((ρˆ(αi)−Q)
which substituted in (24) leads to
αi =
ξ
I
× τ(αi)
δ
+
(
1− ξ
I
)
× E{p−i | γ, αi}
This latter equality can be easily rewritten as in the statement in the Proposition. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 1. Assuming that all players demand some positive quantity at the stop-out price,
the market clearing condition is
∑
i
γ(αi, p) = Q ⇐⇒ p = 1
δ
(
κ0 + κ1
1
I
∑
i
αi − Q
I
)
where the last equality characterizes the auction’s stop-out price. Recall that the support of α˜i is [α, α].
The auction’s stop-out price is positive with probability 1 if and only if14
κ0 + κ1α− Q
I
> 0 (25)
The quantity demanded by bidder i at the stop-out price is
γi(αi, p) = κ0 + κ1αi −
(
κ0 + κ1
1
I
∑
i
αi − Q
I
)
= κ1
(
αi − 1
I
∑
i
αi
)
+
Q
I
=
I − 1
I
κ1
αi − 1
I − 1
∑
j 6=i
αj
+ Q
I
Thus
γi > 0 ⇐⇒ (I − 1)κ1
αi − 1
I − 1
∑
j 6=i
αj
+Q > 0
14 Note that the sop-out price is, a priori, a random variable that depends on the realization of bidders’ types. Positive
with probability 1 means that it is positive for all the possible realizations of the bidders’ types.
22 Francisco Alvarez et al.
The latter equality holds with probability 1 iff
(I − 1)κ1(α− α) +Q > 0 (26)
Combining (25) and (26) we obtain (6).
Next, we give conditions for a non-negative marginal abatement cost. It is
φ(e;αi) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ αi − β(κ0 + κ1αi − δp) ≥ 0
Substituting p from the market clearing condition for interior solution and collecting terms in α’s, the
latter inequality becomes (
1− βκ1
(
1− 1
I
))
αi + βκ1
1
I
∑
j 6=i
αj ≥ βQ
I
The most adverse case on the second term on the left is αj = α for all j 6= i, so that the inequality
becomes (
1− βκ1
(
1− 1
I
))
αi + βκ1
I − 1
I
α ≥ βQ
I
(27)
The coefficient of αi in (27) is non-negative if and only if
βκ1 ≤ I
I − 1 (28)
Thus, if (28) holds, the most adverse case of αi for inequality (27) is αi = α. Substituting this value of
αi, the inequality (27) becomes
α ≥ βQ
I
On the other hand, if the inequality in (28) does not hold, the most adverse case of αi for inequality
(27) is αi = α. Substituting this value of αi, the inequality (27) becomes
α− βκ1 I − 1
I
(α− α) ≥ βQ
I
Inequality (7) summarizes these latter two inequalities. uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that τ is linear, i.e., we restrict to equilibria in which γ is linear in
both arguments, αi and p:
τ(α) = κ0 + κ1α (29)
Using (29), (8) and (17), we can write
ρˆ(αi) = (I − 1)(κ0 + κ1µ) + (I − 1)κ1λαi
In turn, with the above expression for ρˆ(αi), both sides of (23) are linear on αi. Specifically, substituting
in (21) we have
p∗(αi,γ−i) =
1
2 + β(I − 1)δ
(
1 + (1 + β(I − 1)δ)λκ1
δ
)
αi
+
1 + β(I − 1)δ
(2 + β(I − 1)δ)(I − 1)δ ((I − 1)(κ0 + κ1µ)−Q)
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and from (22)
E{po | αi, γ} = 1
Iδ
(λ(I − 1) + 1)κ1αi + 1
Iδ
((I − 1)(κ0 + κ1µ) + κ0 −Q)
Using these expressions, from (23), the coefficients of αi and the intercept on both expressions have to
be equal. Equalizing the coefficients of αi we obtain the following equation
1
β(I − 1) −
(
2
β(I − 1) + λκ1
)
1
ξ
=
1
I
(1− λ)κ1 (30)
where ξ := 2 + β(I − 1)δ, as in the proof of Proposition 1. Notice that there is a one to one mapping
between ξ (or ξ−1) and δ. Equalizing the intercepts (the terms that do not depend on αi), we obtain the
following equation (
1
I − 1Q− (κ0 + κ1µ)
)
1
ξ
+
1
I
κ1µ =
1
I(I − 1)Q (31)
Equations (30) and (31) characterize the equilibrium parameters for any linear strategy γ. The unknowns
are κ0, κ1 and ξ
−1.
From (30), we have that
1
ξ
= m(κ1) (32)
where we have denoted
m(κ1) :=
I − β(I − 1)(1− λ)κ1
2I + β(I − 1)Iλκ1 (33)
It follows that
δ = gδ (κ1) =
(
1
m(κ1)
− 2
)
1
β(I − 1) (34)
Clearly, m is differentiable. Straightforward computations show that m′(κ1) < 0 if λ ≥ 0 and m(0) = 12 .
The properties of gδ follow from the properties of m.
Substituting (32) into (31) and solving for κ0, we get
κ0 = g0 (κ1) =
(
1− 1
Im(κ1)
)(
1
I − 1Q− κ1µ
)
(35)
The right hand side of equation (35) defines g0. uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the first inequality in (6), substitute the expression for κ0 given in
(35) and re-order terms to obtain(
1− 1
m(κ1)
)
1
I − 1Q+
(
α+ µ
(
1
Im(κ1)
− 1
))
Iκ1 ≥ 0 (36)
Step 1. We show that (36) neither holds for κ1 = 0 nor for κ1 → ∞. If κ1 = 0, using that m(0) = 1/2,
(36) collapses to
− 1
I − 1Q ≥ 0
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which does not hold. Furthermore, as κ1 →∞, we have m(κ1)→ − 1−λIλ . For λ 6= 1, the sign of the left
hand side in (36) as κ1 →∞ is given by the coefficient of κ1 with m(κ1) at its limiting value:
α− µ 1
1− λ = α− E{α˜} (37)
where we have used (17) . The expression on the right hand side of (37) is clearly negative.
Step 2. Consider κp1, defined by βκ1(I − 1) = I. It is
m (κp1) =
λ
2 + λI
For κ1 = κ
p
1, taking limits in (36) as λ→ 0 we have
− 1
I − 1Q+ µκ
p
1 ≥ 0
where µ→ E{α˜i} as λ→ 0. Using the expression for κp1, the latter inequality becomes
βQ
I
≤ E{α˜i} (38)
Now consider the second inequality in (6) for κ1 = κ
p
1. It is
(I − 1)κp1(α− α) ≤ Q ⇐⇒ α− α ≤
βQ
I
(39)
Finally, condition (7) for κ1 = κ
p
1 becomes
βQ
I
≤ α (40)
which is more restrictive than (38). Combining (39) and (40) we obtain (9). Using a continuity argument,
it follows the existence of an interval containing κp1 and some non-empty interval in [0, λ
u). uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 2.
1. We solve the problem that characterizes the efficient allocation for a given vector of type realizations,
say α = (α1, . . . , αI). We define the lagrangian
L =
I∑
i=1
∫ e∗i (αi)
qi
φ(e;αi)de+ θ
(
I∑
i=1
qi −Q
)
where non-negativity constraints are omitted for sake of simplicity and θ denotes the multiplier. The
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
φ(qi;αi) = θ i ∈ {1, . . . , I} (41)
θ
(
I∑
i=1
qi −Q
)
= 0 θ ≥ 0
An interior allocation occurs when φ(qi;αi) > 0 holds, which implies θ > 0 and thus
I∑
i=1
qi −Q = 0 (42)
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Next, we solve in q’s the set of equations given by (41) and (42). These equations conform a system
of linear equations which can be solved using standard linear algebra. Alternatively, consider any
i 6= 1 and use (41) to write
q1 − qi = 1
β
(α1 − αi) (43)
Substituting in (42) for any i 6= 1 and then solving (42) for q1 we have
q1 =
Q
I
− 1
βI
∑
i 6=1
αi − (I − 1)α1

Substituting back in (43) and solving for qi we obtain
qi =
Q
I
− 1
βI
∑
j 6=i
αj − (I − 1)αi
 (44)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Using (44), the non-negativity requirement can be writen
qi ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Q ≥ 1
β
∑
j 6=i
αj − (I − 1)αi

Considering the most adverse realizations, the latter inequality becomes
Q ≥ 1
β
(I − 1) (α− α) (45)
Analogously, using (44), the non-negativity of the marginal abatement cost (equivalently, the condi-
tion for θ > 0) can be writen
φ(qi;αi) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Q ≤ 1
β
∑
i
αi
Considering the most adverse realizations, the latter inequality becomes
Q ≤ 1
β
Iα (46)
This part of the Lemma follows trivially from the combination of (45) and (46).
2. If the efficient allocation is interior, from (41), for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , I}, it is
αi − αj = β(qi − qj)
Now assume that q’s in this latter equality come from an equilibrium in the auction in which all
bidders play a strategy as in (3) and that leads to an interior allocation, that is, for any h ∈ {1, . . . , I}
it is
qh = τ(αh)− δp∗
where p∗ is the stop-out price in the auction. Combining the previous two equalities, we have
1
β
=
τ(αi)− τ(αj)
αi − αj
This latter equality holds for any arbitrary pair of realizations αi and αj in [α, α] if and only if it is
τ(α) = κ0 + β
−1α, where κ0 is an arbitrary parameter. uunionsq
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Proof of Proposition 4. Write the inequalities that characterize interior equilibria for λ = 0. First,
take λ = 0 in (33) and substitute into (36) to obtain(
1− 2
1− x
)
βQ
I
+
(
Iα+ µ
(
2
1− x − I
))
x ≥ 0 (47)
where we have denoted x := β I−1I κ1. From Proposition 2, interior equilibria are indexed by κ1, so they
are equivalently indexed by x. Recall that this latter inequality is the first inequality in (6). Using the
definition of x, the second inequality in (6) becomes:
βQ
I
≥ x(α− α) (48)
Finally, the condition (7) can be written
βQ
I
≤
{
α if x ≤ 1
α− x (α− α) otherwise (49)
Thus, for λ = 0, x defines an interior equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (47) to (49).
Rewrite (47) as
βQ
I
+ I(α− µ)x+
(
µx− βQ
I
)
2
1− x ≥ 0 (50)
where we must recall that x := β I−1I κ1. Notice that for x = 1 this latter inequality collapses to
µ ≥ βQ
I
which is implied by (9). In addition, for x = 1 (48) and (49) collapse to (9). Thus, under (9) there is an
interior equilibrium for x = 1 or, equivalently
κ1 =
1
β
I
I − 1
Now consider 1− x > 0. Write (50) as
I(µ− α)x2 +
(
2µ− I(µ− α)− βQ
I
)
x− βQ
I
≥ 0 (51)
Let us denote by h a function of x such that (51) is h(x) ≥ 0. Clearly, h is quadratic, convex since
µ− α > 0 holds and it satisfies h(0) < 0 and h(1) = 2
(
µ− βQI
)
> 0. Thus, there is a unique value of x
in (0, 1), say x∗, such that (51) holds if and only if x ∈ [x∗, 1]. More concretely, h(x) = 0 has necessarily
two real roots and x∗ is the largest (and the only positive) root. Notice also that (48) and (49) are
implied by (9) for any x < 1.
If 1 − x < 0, then from (50) we obtain h(x) ≤ 0, where h is still the left hand side of (51). Thus,
this latter inequality cannot hold for x > 1. Therefore, the set of interior equilibria are characterized by
x ∈ [x∗, 1]. Denoting κ∗1 such that x∗ = β I−1I κ∗1, the interior equilibria are characterized equivalently by
κ1 ∈
(
κ∗1,
1
β
I
I−1
)
.
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The sensitivity analysis of κ∗1 is equivalent to x
∗. Consider first a variation in µ keeping all other
parameters constant. Taking total differential in the latter equality, we have
(2 + I(x∗ − 1))x∗dµ+
(
2µ+ I(µ− α)(2x∗ − 1)− βQ
I
)
dx∗ = 0 (52)
Since x∗ < 1 holds, the coefficient of dµ is negative if I is large enough. To analyze the sign of the
coefficient of dx we must notice first that (9) implies 2µ − βQI > 0, so a sufficient condition for that
coefficient to be positive is 2x∗ − 1 > 0 or, equivalently, x∗ > 12 . It is
h
(
1
2
)
= µ− 1
4
I(µ− α)− 3
2
βQ
I
Thus, h
(
1
2
)
< 0 holds if I is large enough, which in turn implies that x∗ > 12 . Therefore, for I large
enough, the coefficient of dµ is negative whereas the coefficient of dx is positive, which implies dµ and
dx∗ must have the same sign.
Let s := µ − α. Consider a variation in s keeping all other parameters (in particular µ) constant.
Taking total differential in h(x∗) = 0 we have
Ix∗(x∗ − 1)ds+
(
2µ+ Is(2x∗ − 1)− βQ
I
)
dx∗ = 0
The coefficient of ds in the previous expression is negative since x∗ < 1, whereas, following an argument
as above, the coefficient of dx∗ is positive if I is large enough. Thus, for I large enough ds and dx∗ must
have the same sign.
Consider a variation in Q keeping all other parameters constant. Taking total differential in h(x∗) = 0
we have
−1
I
(x∗ + 1)βdQ+
(
2µ− βQ
I
+ I(µ− α)(2x∗ − 1)
)
dx∗ = 0
Using an analogous reasoning, when I is large enough we obtain that dQ and dx∗ must have the same sign.
It rests to prove that the efficient equilibrium, βκ1 = 1, belongs to the set of interior equilibrium for
I large enough. Notice that βκ1 = 1 implies x =
I−1
I . It conforms an interior equilibrium if and only if
it satisfies (47) to (49). Substituting in (47), we have
I − 1
2I − 1(α+ µ) ≥
βQ
I
(53)
whereas substituting in (48) and (49) we have
α ≥ βQ
I
≥ I − 1
I
(α− α) (54)
For any I finite, (54) is implied by (9). In addition, (53) is also implied by (9) if
I − 1
2I − 1(α+ µ) ≥ α
The coefficient of α + µ in this latter inequality is strictly increasing and continuous in I. It converges
to 12 as I → ∞. The inequality clearly holds at the limiting value of that coefficient, thus it must hold
for any I larger than some finite threshold. uunionsq
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Proof of Proposition 5.
1. The necessary and sufficient conditions for κ1 to constitute an interior equilibrium are (47) to (49),
in Proposition 4, where x = β I−1I κ1. Taking βκ1 = 1, (47) becomes
α+ µ ≥
(
1 +
I
I − 1
)
βQ
I
(55)
Also (48) and (49) become
α− α ≤ βQ
I − 1 ≤
I
I − 1α (56)
The inequalities (55) and (56) are implied by (10) just notting that λ = 0 implies µ = E{α˜} > α.
The efficient equilibrium strategy follows from taking κ1 = β
−1 and λ = 0 in (32) to (35), in the
proof of Proposition 2. To show that the efficient strategy satisfies (11) is left to the part 4 of this proof.
2. Take again the characterization of equilibrium as (47) to (49). We write I →∞ to represent: I →∞
and Q→∞ while QI remains constant. If I →∞ for βκ1 6= 1, then (47) converges to
(α− µ)x ≥ 0
which cannot hold: α− µ < 0 holds for any non-degenerated distribution of types, while x > 0 ⇐⇒
κ1 > 0 and, from Proposition 2, this latter equality must hold at any equilibrium under which firms
submit downward sloping demand functions. In addition, for βκ1 = 1, the conditions for an interior
equilibrium are (55) and (56), which hold in the limiting case I →∞ under (10).
3. Take I = 2 and let βκ1 be arbitrary. Using (32) to (35), in the proof of Proposition 2, we have
m(κ1) =
1
4
(2− βκ1); κ0 = βκ1
2− βκ1 (κ1µ−Q) ; δ =
2κ1
2− βκ1 (57)
From the latter equality, we have a downward sloping demand if and only if βκ1 ∈ (0, 2). The
conditions for an interior equilibrium in Lemma 1, for I = 2, can be written as follows. (6) is
βκ0 + βκ1α >
βQ
2
>
1
2
βκ1 (α− α) (58)
In addition, since βκ1 ≤ 2, the condition (7) is
βQ
2
≤ α (59)
The second equality in (58) and (59) are implied by (10). Use the expression for κ0 above to write
the first inequality in (58) as
βκ1µ+ (2− βκ1)α ≥
(
2
βκ1
+ 1
)
βQ
2
The left hand side of the previous inequality is continuous and strictly increasing in βκ1 as µ > α
holds. The right hand side is continuous and strictly decreasing. Clearly, the inequality fails to hold
as βκ1 → 0, whereas it is implied by (10) at βκ1 = 1. Thus, under (10), there must exist a unique
b0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for any βκ1 ∈ (0, 2) the inequality holds iff βκ1 ∈ (b0, 2).
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4. We prove (11) for I = 2 and βκ1 ∈ (0, 2). For any linear strategy, the stop-out price in the auction
is defined by the market clearing condition
2κ0 + κ1
∑
i
αi − 2δp∗ = Q
Using the expressions for κ0 and δ in (57), we have
p∗(αˆ) =
1
βδ
(
βκ0 − 1
2
βQ+ βκ1αˆ
)
(60)
where αˆ denotes the sample mean of types and the notation emphasizes that the stop out price
depends on it. Denoting by q∗i the auction assignment for bidder i, his marginal saving on abatement
cost is
φi(q
∗
i , αi) = αi − βq∗i = αi − β (κ0 + κ1αi − δp∗(αˆ)) (61)
Taking expectations in (61), substituting in (11) and re-arranging terms, (11) is equivalent to
(1− βδ)E{p∗(αˆ) | αi} ≤ (1− βκ1)αi − βκ0 (62)
Taking expectations in (60) and substituting into (62), we can rewrite (62) as(
1
βδ
− 1
)(
βκ0 − 1
2
βQ+
1
2
βκ1 (αi + E{α˜i})
)
≤ (1− βκ1)αi − βκ0
where we have used that, since bidder i only observes his own type and types are independent, it is
E{αˆ | αi} = 1
2
(αi + E{α˜i})
The latter inequality is equivalent to
1
βδ
βκ0 − 1
2
(
1
βδ
− 1
)
βQ+
((
1
βδ
− 1
)
1
2
βκ1 − 1 + βκ1
)
αi +
1
2
(
1
βδ
− 1
)
βκ1E{α˜i} ≤ 0
Using the expression for δ in this latter inequality yields
2− βκ1
2βκ1
βκ0 − 2− 3βκ1
4βκ1
βQ− 1
4
(2− βκ1)αi + 1
4
(2− 3βκ1)E{α˜i} ≤ 0
Finally, using the expression for κ0 in this latter inequality yields
−2− βκ1
4
(
βQ
βκ1
+ αi − E{α˜i}
)
≤ 0
since βκ1 ∈ (0, 2), the latter inequality is equivalent to
βQ ≥ βκ1 (E{α˜i} − αi) (63)
But (63) is implied by the first inequality in (10) since βκ1 ≤ 2 and α > E{α˜i}.
Finally, we prove (11) for I > 2 and βκ1 = 1. Notice that in this case (11) can still be written as
(62). The efficient strategy satisfies βκ1 = 1. In addition, using the value for κ0 and δ for the efficient
strategy, in the part 1 of the Proposition, we can rewrite (62) as
E{p∗(αˆ) | αi} ≥ E{α˜i} − I
I − 1
βQ
I
(64)
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To obtain the stop out price, we consider the market clearing condition∑
i
γ(αi, p) = Q
Use the expression for γ in the part 1 of the Proposition, solve for p, to obtain
p∗(αˆ) =
1
2
(E{α˜i}+ αˆ)− 1
2
(
I
I − 1 + 1
)
βQ
I
where, as before, αˆ denotes the sample mean of types. Analogously to the two-bidder case, notice
that
E{αˆ | αi} = I − 1
I
E{α˜i}+ 1
I
αi
Taking conditional expectations on the previous expression for p∗(αˆ), substituting in (64) and re-
arranging terms, (64) is equivalent to
βQ
I − 1 > E{α˜i} − αi
This latter inequality is clearly implied by the first inequality in (10) just noting that it is
E{α˜i} − αi ≤ α− α
uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 6.
1. We write the inequalities that characterize interior equilibria for λ = 1/2. Note that λ = 1/2 implies
µ = E{α˜i}2 . First, (33) is
m(κ1) =
1− x
2 + Ix
where x := β I−12I κ1. From Proposition 2, interior equilibria are indexed by κ1, so they are equivalently
indexed by x. Substitute the expressions for m(κ1) and µ into (36) to obtain(
1− 2 + Ix
1− x
)
βQ
2I
+
(
Iα+
E { α˜i}
2
(
2 + Ix
1− x − I
))
x ≥ 0 (65)
Recall that this latter inequality is the first inequality in (6). Using the definition of x, the second
inequality in (6) becomes:
βQ
I
≥ 2x(α− α) (66)
Finally, condition (7) can be written
βQ
I
≤
{
α if x ≤ 1/2
α− 2x (α− α) otherwise (67)
Thus, for λ = 1/2, x defines an interior equilibrium if and only if it satisfies (65) to (67).
Take βκ1 = 1. Then
2 + Ix
1− x =
I(I + 3)
I + 1
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Thus, (65) can be written
α+
1
2
E{α˜i}
(
I + 3
I + 1
− 1
)
≥
(
I + 3
I + 1
− 1
I
)
βQ
I − 1
or, equivalently,
α+
1
I + 1
E{α˜i} ≥ βQ
I
+
2
I + 1
βQ
I − 1
Using (10), it suffices to add the first inequality in (14) for this latter inequality to hold. In addition,
(66) and (67), for βκ1 = 1, collapse to
I − 1
I
(α− α) ≤ βQ
I
≤ α
These latter two inequalities are implied by (10). The efficient equilibrium strategy follows from tak-
ing κ1 = β
−1 and λ = 12 in (32) to (35), in the proof of Proposition 2.
As in the proof of Proposition 5, we can write (11) as (62). For the case λ = 12 , the efficient equilibrium
strategy is presented in the part 1 of this Proposition, in particular
κ0 =
1
β
1
I + 1
(
E{α˜i} − 2 I
I − 1
βQ
I
)
; κ1 =
1
β
: δ =
1
β
I + 2
I + 1
Substituting in (62) and re-arranging terms, it is
E{p∗(αˆ) | αi} ≥ E{α˜i} − 2 I
I − 1
βQ
I
(68)
In the other hand, the stop-out price follows from the usual market-clearing condition, as in the proof
of Proposition 5, leading to
p∗(αˆ) =
1
βδ
(
βκ0 + βκ1αˆ− βQ
I
)
(69)
where αˆ denotes the sample mean of the types. Under λ = 12 , it is
E{αˆ | αi} = I − 1
I
E{α˜j | αi}+ 1
I
αi =
I − 1
2I
E{α˜i}+ I + 1
2I
αi (70)
where j 6= i. Taking the conditional expectation on the stop-out price, using the parameter values of
the equilibrium strategy and substituting into (68), we can rewrite it as(
2I
I − 1 −
I + 1
I + 2
(
1
I + 1
2I
I − 1 + 1
))
βQ
I
≥
(
1− I + 1
I + 2
(
1
I + 1
+
I − 1
2I
))
E{α˜i} − I + 1
I + 2
I + 1
2I
αi
or, equivalently
βQ
I − 1 ≥
1
2
(E{α˜i} − αi)
which is implied for all αi ∈ Ω by the first inequality in (10).
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2. In the remainder of the proof we write I → ∞ to represent: I → ∞ and Q → ∞ while βQI remains
constant. Taking I →∞, x→ βκ12 . Additionally, considering x 6= 0, equation (65) converges to
α+
1
2
v(x) ≥ 0 (71)
where we have denoted
v(x) :=
1
1− x
(
E{α˜i} (2x− 1)− βQ
I
)
Note that v is unbounded at x = 1. Under (9), it is
E{α˜i} − βQ
I
> α− βQ
I
> 0
Thus, as x → 1 from the left and from the right, it is limx→1− v(x) = ∞ and limx→1+ v(x) = −∞,
respectively. Furthermore
v′(x) =
1
(1− x)2
(
E{α˜i} − βQ
I
)
which is positive from (9). In turn, (9) is implied by (10). In fact, in the remainder of this part of the
proof it will suffice to use (9) instead of (10). Note that limx→∞ v(x) = −2E{α˜i}. Using this latter
limit in (71) and taking into account that v is strictly increasing, (71) cannot hold for any x > 1.
Equivalently, there cannot be interior equilibrium for any κ1 such that βκ1 > 2 holds as I →∞.
Note that v(1/2) = −2βQI . Thus, (71) holds with strict inequality under (9) for x = 1/2. Taking
into account that v is strictly increasing, (71) holds for any x ∈ [1/2, 1]. Notice that (66) and (67)
are unaffected by taking I → ∞. For x = 1/2, (66) and (67) are implied by (9), so that x = 1/2,
or equivalently βκ1 = 1, that is, the efficient allocation, constitutes an interior equilibrium. Within
x ∈ (1/2, 1], the most restrictive case for (66) and (67) to hold is at x = 1. For that value of x,
(66) and (67) are equivalent to the second and third inequalities in (14). Now consider x ∈ (0, 12).
(66) and (67) are implied by (9). Under (9), (71) holds with strict inequality for x = 1/2. Since v is
continuous and increasing at any x ≤ 1/2, (71) must also hold if and only if x ∈ (x∗, 1/2), for some
x∗ ∈ (0, 1/2). The relation between x∗ and b1 follows from x→ βκ12 as I →∞.
As in the proof of Proposition 5, we can write (11) as (62). Combining with the expression of the
stop-out price, in (69), we can write (11) as
1
βδ
βκ0 +
(
1
βδ
− 1
)(
βκ1E{αˆ | αi} − βQ
I
)
≤ (1− βκ1)αi
Taking limits as I →∞ in (70) and substituting in the later inequality, we can rewrite it as
1
βδ
βκ0 +
(
1
βδ
− 1
)(
1
2
βκ1E{α˜i} − βQ
I
)
≤
(
1− βκ1 −
(
1
βδ
− 1
)
1
2
βκ1
)
αi (72)
Next, we use the expressions in (32) to (35), in the proof of Proposition 2. Taking λ = 12 and I →∞,
it is
lim
I→∞
I
ξ
= lim
I→∞
Im(κ1) ⇐⇒ 1
βδ
=
2− βκ1
βκ1
;
and
lim
I→∞
βκ0 =
(
1− βκ1
2− βκ1
)(
βQ
I
− 1
2
E{α˜i}βκ1
)
Using these limit values into (72) we have 0 ≤ 0 for any βκ1 6= 0. uunionsq
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Proof of Corollary 1. With βκ1 =
3
2 , x, as defined in the proof of Proposition (6) is x =
3(I−1)
4I , so
that m(κ1) =
I+3
I(3I+5) . From the definition of ξ in the proof of Proposition 2, substituting in equations
(32)
δ =
I(3I + 5)− 2(I + 3)
β(I + 3)(I − 1) (73)
that tends to 3β as I →∞. From (35)
κ0 =
(
1− 3I + 5
I + 3
)(
1
I − 1Q−
3
2β
E(αi
2
)
(74)
that tends to 32βE(αi) as I →∞. uunionsq
Proof of Corollary 2. It follows from the definition of ξ in the proof of the Proposition 2, substitution
of the corresponding value of λ and κ1 = 1/β in equations (32) to (35), and then taking limits as I →∞,
Q→∞ and QI stays constant. uunionsq
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